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Structured Abstract 
Purpose:  By tracing the history of the links of financialization to consumer behaviors and 
marketer actions in the 20th century, this paper aims to show that consumer market 
phenomena are often shaped by the imperatives of finance.                            
Design/methodology/approach: The paper employs selective historical overviews, mainly 
focusing on the United States, of four tranches of the past century: (1) the run up to the 
Great Depression, (2) from post-Depression to World War II, (3) the post WW-II Bretton 
Woods system and its collapse in the 1970s, and (4) the increasingly risk-charged last three 
post-Bretton Woods decades of the 20th century.                             
Findings: The historical review shows that financial sector’s interest in profiting from 
consumer markets emerged and grew fairly early in the 20th century, experienced some 
slowdown and forced retrenchment due to the military-industrial build up prior to and 
during WW-II, and re-accelerated in post-WW-II period – reaching an unsustainable risky 
zenith by the closing years of the century.                             
Practical implications: Findings and arguments from this paper can be of value to citizen 
and consumer advocates seeking to bring Finanzkapital activities under popular and 
democratic control.                              
Social implications: Insights from this paper should motivate us to study in greater depth 
how established and seemingly autonomous consumer and marketer behaviors, in the 
ultimate, may be guided by and have to conform to the dictates of financial capital.                              
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180354
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Originality/value: The main contribution is an elaboration of how financial capitalism has 
shaped consumption styles and marketing practices in the last century.                              
Keywords 





“If anyone wishes to paint the genesis of things in our society, he will paint [on the 
ceiling of Sistine chapel] a picture of god holding out to Adam a check-book or credit 
card or Charge-A-Plate.” 
– Randall Jarrell (1962)  
 
The post-2007 financial crisis opened up multiple intellectual inquiries about not only 
how financialization shaped the global political economy (e.g., Dholakia 2011) but also how it 
permeated daily life. It reignited interested in ‘Finanzkapital’, the original German term for 
financialization of capitalism, introduced by Hilferding (1910) soon after the dawn of the 20th 
century. The link between finance and commercial and consumer life is not new (Calder 1999) – 
but is not explored much in marketing literature. In this Explorations note, I discuss how 
financialization (Epstein 2005) shaped consumers and marketing institutions in the 20th century. 
Consumer credit is not an invention of the 20th century – the 1890 U.S. census estimated 
consumer credit to be $844 per household (Calder 1999).  The 20th century, however, saw the 
emergence and proliferation of an unprecedented range of consumer credit tools – all of which 
link rhizomatically to centers of global finance.  
Finanzkapital of course shapes marketing not just through consumer credit: it also 
directs marketing strategy to strengthen the top, bottom, or in-between lines in the income 
statements of brand marketers – indeed financial surveillance of business tends to reinforce all 
capillaries that connect industrial to institutional capital. Drawing upon considerable evidence 
from business and marketing history, Tadajewski (2009) has argued that from late 1920s “the 
growing interest in commercial research and the shift from a production orientation [and to a 
consumer orientation] can be attributed to the pressures placed on business by the banking 
industry” (p. 197). 
My approach here is in the tradition of writings in marketing that deal with larger 
macro-level forces at play, resulting in structuring of micro-level consumer choices and actions 
as well as shaping of consumer lifestyles and consumption patterns (Firat and Dholakia 1982, 
Nason  2008). The discussion that follows is organized along three 20th century watershed 
events – Great Depression, Second World War, and Bretton Woods Erosion. These events split 
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the 20th century into four tranches. Concluding comments close the 20th century discussion, but 
with trepidation expressed for the unfolding 21st century. 
The Path to Great Depression 
The dawn of 20th century was also the opening page of pervasive modernity in 
marketing formats – not just in London or Paris but also in the then-emerging economy of USA. 
In his well-documented study of the Philadelphia and New York stores of John Wanamaker, 
Tadajewski (2008) notes the appearance of many modern marketing formats – well-lit spacious 
interiors, restrooms, fixed prices, straight-talk advertising, corporate public relations – by the 
opening of the century. 
In the United States, a unique engine – literally and figuratively – for innovations in 
marketing and consumer finance was the automobile industry. Although Ford had early success 
with mass production and marketing of the Model T, the transformational innovation was the 
creation by General Motors (GM) of a financing company, the General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation (GMAC). Historical notes at the GM Heritage Center website inform us of the 
following (Bowman n.d.): 
In the early days of the motor vehicle industry, dealers paid cash to stock their 
inventory, purchasing just a few vehicles at a time. With the onset of the assembly line, 
manufacturers wanted dealers to buy vehicles in large quantities, in order to keep 
factories running regularly. GMAC was formed in 1919 and provided GM dealers with 
the financing they needed to maintain their vehicle inventories, as well as give the 
dealer's retail customers the ability to purchase new vehicles easily and conveniently. 
[In]… 1919… [the] first branch was opened in New York City and was capitalized at 
$2,500,000. Later that year, branches opened in Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, and 
Toronto. [In] 1920… [a] branch opened in Great Britain… [By] 1928… [the] four millionth 
retail contract was signed… [and by] 1958… GMAC financed its 40 millionth vehicle and 
its first ever annual earnings of $1 billion were achieved. GMAC also entered the 
mortgage business at this time.  
It was the imperatives of industrial capital (keeping the assembly line running), and not the 
needs of the consumers, that created the powerful and life-shaping system of automobile 
finance. Over time, these imperatives transformed to those of Finanzkapital: GMAC (renamed 
Ally Bank after the wrenching restructuring of 2009) evolved into a major bank and mortgage 
lender. 
Consumer credit modernized rapidly. In the second decade of the 20th century, 
consumer credit in the United States – hitherto provided by informal lenders – started 
transforming into a formalized financial system. Calder (1999) writes: 
…the modern system of credit for consumption has its roots in the two decades after 
1915… Modern consumer credit was built on two institutional foundations. The first was 
a particular method of credit – the installment plan… The installment plan was to 
consumer credit what the moving assembly line was to the automobile industry. 
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Without it, today’s trillion dollar consumer credit industry would be inconceivable. The 
other institutional foundation was an array of particular sources of credit…retailers, 
commercial banks, personal finance companies, and sales finance companies (p. 17, 
italics original). 
For Finanzkapital, the new and varied sources of consumer credit opened up new pathways for 
capital accumulation. Calder reports that the new consumer credit companies “adopted new 
strategies to pursue aggressively the profits to be made in consumer lending markets” (p. 18). 
The rise of consumer credit from the 1920s was spectacular, with the Depression putting only a 
temporary break: 
American household finance was remade after 1915 [leading to]…rising level[s] of 
consumer debt…personal debt increased at rates well ahead of the rate of population 
growth… From 1920 to 1929, the volume of consumer debt soared upward 131 percent, 
from $3.3 billion to $7.6 billion outstanding. The Depression interrupted this rising 
curve, but by 1937 consumer debt reached its pre-Depression levels and continued 
rising upwards, until it was halted by credit controls during World War II (Calder 1999, p. 
18). 
The 1920s also saw the emergence of what we now call the “marketing of financial services”.  
Since informal consumer credit had a bad reputation, the formal consumer credit companies 
campaigned to change the image – indeed the very moral basis – of consumer credit. To quote 
Calder again: 
Painfully aware of the stigma attached to their forerunners in the consumer credit 
business – pawnbrokers and loan sharks – the innovators of the credit revolution used 
advertising and “educational” public relations campaigns to bring lending and borrowing 
out of the urban shadows… By [1929], phrases such as “Buy Now, Pay Later!” and “Take 
Advantage of Our Easy Payment Plan!” were standard phrases in the vocabulary of 
American consumership (p. 20). 
The 1920s thus were as a turning point in the relationship between Finanzkapital and 
marketing. For the czars of finance, marketing was no longer a sideshow of carnival-barkers and 
loan hucksters: it had become an important new source to feed the insatiable accretive-
accumulative urges of Finanzkapital. Consumer credit systems created profitable capillaries and 
siphons from Main Street to Wall Street. 
In the run up to the Great Depression, the center of Finanzkapital had shifted from 
London to New York. Crafts and Fearon (2010) report that: 
…after 1918 America replaced Britain as the world’s leading international lender… 
Massive war debts accumulated by Britain and France [in WW-I] were owed to both the 
US government and to US private citizens…the post-war network of inter-government 
indebtedness eventually involved 28 countries, with Germany the most heavily in debt 
… Between 1924 and 1931 the US was responsible for about 60 per cent of total 
international lending, about one-third of which was absorbed by Germany… Austria, 
Hungary, Greece, Italy, and Poland, together with several Latin American countries, 
were also considered attractive opportunities by US investors. By paying for imports and 
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by investing overseas the US was able to send abroad a stream of dollars, which enabled 
other countries not only to import more goods but also to service their international 
debts (p. 289).  
 
We can see here the laying of the foundations for the dollarized global (no longer national) 
Finanzkapital, trade, and marketing that defined the century; with USA as the hub. 
Reforms, Rise of Nazism, and World War-II 
Since the world economy had become interconnected by the 1920s, the Depression 
spread globally – particularly to Europe – though with varying degrees of national severity 
(Crafts and Fearon 2010). The responses to Depression were also varying, particularly in the 
United States and Germany.  In both cases, as WW-II approached, Finanzkapital circuits were 
temporarily rearranged – more severely in Germany – to channel consumer financial resources 
into war efforts. 
In Germany, smarting under the onerous burden of WW-I reparations and massive debt, 
conditions were ripe for the rise of Nazism. By appealing to jingoistic nationalism and racial 
supremacy, the Nazi regime created a tightly controlled statist system where unions were 
banned, young men were conscripted, heavy industry and exports were promoted, and imports 
were curbed. The banking system had undergone a severe crisis prior to Hitler assuming power 
in 1933, and many controls were already in place to prevent currency flight. Rising saving banks 
deposits – Deutschemark savings of German consumers, barred from moving money into 
foreign currencies and with spending curtailed by import controls – found their way into the 
war coffers of the Third Reich: 
Aggregate savings deposits increased 110 percent between 1929 and 1938 more rapidly 
than earned income … the Third Reich was the beneficiary, in that two-fifths of the 
increase in deposits between 1932 and 1938 was applied to the purchase of the funded 
loans of the Reich [for armaments and heavy industry]. This was the so-called noiseless 
financing, which used direct placement to bypass stock market flotation, thus 
eliminating the public signal of a market valuation of Reich debt. The application of 
savings bank deposits in this way was also assisted by the reduction of savings banks' 
advances to business and by the slower growth of their mortgage lending in the 1930s 
than in the 1920s… (Balderston 1991, pp. 603-604). 
 
The above quote indicates a number of processes at work during the rise of Nazism: (1) high 
rates of consumer savings in Germany, (2) channeling of these savings into Third Reich 
armaments purchasing, (3) such channeling facilitated by curbing day-to-day consumption 
(consumer austerity) and curbing mortgage loans to consumers, (4) avoidance of financial 
market scrutiny by the Third Reich by directly appropriating consumers’ bank savings for war 





A perverse side note to the consumer austerity of the Nazi era was the Party’s ‘Strength 
through Joy’ (KdF: Kraft durch Freude) program that provided leisure opportunities – such as 
Mediterranean vacations – to selected few “master race” workers, as a foretaste of what future 
would be like once Europe and North Africa were conquered (Baranowski 2004). 
In the United States, the responses to Depression can be described as a hodgepodge of 
populist measures, bank reforms, spasmodic stimulus attempts, and strengthening of labor 
unions – and eventually, massive building up of the military-industrial complex. While 
haphazard, the overall impact was a high-growth economy, though it was briefly derailed by the 
sharp recession of 1937-38.  U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates were strong in the 
mid-1930s (10.9% in 1934, 8.9% in 1935, and 13.1% in 1936) and spectacular in the early 1940s: 
17.1% in 1941, 18.5% in 1942, and 16.4% in 1943. 
By the time America entered the war in 1941, its economy was booming and consumer 
incomes were rising. The mass psychology of war required a shared sense of national sacrifice, 
at least symbolic curtailments of consumption. There were some shortages and privations, but 
by and large – apart from the bloody human costs on the battlefields in Europe and Asia – 
Americans continued to enjoy most elements of the good life that they had been accustomed 
to (Leff 1991). Indeed, American brands – with Coca-Cola as the magnificent exemplar – 
increased their share of the market and of the mind, by building patriotic associations to the 
war effort (Weiner 2002). 
The end of the war also shaped American politics at home and abroad.  For a while, with 
reconstruction programs like the Marshall Plan – positioned as a benevolent venture but also 
crafted opportunistically to bring increasing business to American firms – the private corporate 
and financial capitalism of the preeminent postwar nation was sheathed in interventionist, 
“blockage-removing”, state capitalist flows of funds to war ravaged nations (Maier 1991). The 
American state enjoyed a few years of bipartisan (in terms of domestic politics) autonomy to 
reshape the worlds of finance, trade, and aid – and to lay the groundwork for the abbreviated 
Golden Age that followed. 
A Golden Age? 
The system of Finanzkapital was cast in the American mould in 1944 when delegates 
from 44 allied nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and hammered out the 
institutional frame for the post-WW-II financial system – the Bretton Woods System. The 
subsequent 1945-1970 period – the so-called abbreviated ‘American Century’ – was as close as 
possible to being the Golden Age of Finanzkapital as well as of marketing. While the seeds of 
modern consumer culture were planted in the 1920s, they effloresced after WW-II. Picking up 
the storyline of the 1920s in the West: 
…from the post-war period, consumer culture…promoted a powerful link between 
everyday consumption and modernization…the burgeoning advertising and marketing of 
this era were selling not just consumer goods, but consumerism itself as the shining 
path to modernity: they incited their publics to modernize themselves, modernize their 
homes, their means of transport (Slater 1997, pp. 12-13). 
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Of course the rapid-fire and pervasive modernization of life required modern means of 
consumer finance, and the credit card was born (Klein 1999). Managed by banks, the credit 
card generalized the system of consumer credit – much more so in the U.S. than in Europe 
(Longemann 2008). Rather than obtaining loans for specific items from sellers or 
manufacturers, these cards could be used to buy anything, including intangibles and services – 
items that could not serve as collateral or be repossessed. Credit cards were the claws of 
Finanzkapital embedded into the very core of consumer lives. 
While Finanzkapital was inexorably globalizing in the background, in this third tranche of 
the century there were still nationalist sentiments attached to industrial capital and to brands. 
In particular, the U.S. dominance of finance was causing alarm. From 1945 to 1960, the U.S. 
accounted for about three-fourths of worldwide Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). From Europe, 
Servan-Schreiber (1967) railed against the hegemony of American businesses and brands, 
supported by the massive tide of American outward FDI. The Golden Age was thus an age of 
national contestation, with some pretense that capital and brands it controlled had some 
national character. 
Such financial nationalism disappeared fast. Where it did not, it created major 
problems. In Japan, the government-surveilled tight linkage of Japanese Finanzkapital to 
Japanese industry and brands ultimately proved disastrous.  In America, unhampered by 
nationalism, despite lurching crises, the Wall Street centers of finance moved with alacrity to 
invest in or lend to brand-owning enterprises, and to consumers, in all parts of the globe – and 
avoided the Japanese fate of stagnation, at least until the close of the 20th century. 
Century’s End: Crumbling of Bretton Woods 
The telling term to mark the century’s final historical watershed came from Japan: 
“Nixon Shokku” or Nixon Shock (Sen 1982). In 1970, President Nixon abandoned the gold 
standard undergirding the American dollar, and this led to a world of floating currencies. The 
Golden Age institutions of global finance, emanating from Bretton Woods, began to fray at the 
edges. From the global manager of currencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
scrambled for a new role – and this scramble continues. Since 1970, IMF has variously acted as 
the lender of last resort to governments, an arbiter among nations and banks, and – most 
dreadfully, especially for consumers in developing nations – as the Global Financial Disciplining 
Agency capable of forcing the price of bread to triple overnight at the corner store.  
By 1970s, the veneer of nationalism about industries and brands had dissolved, at least 
in America. Finanzkapital had conditioned American consumers thoroughly to buy Japanese 
brands, made in China, sold through American mega-stores, and paid for with Euro-American 
credit cards. With the crumbling of the Bretton Woods System, what Appadurai (1990) has 
called “finanscapes” are no longer national and somewhat rule bound, and this has opened the 
floodgates for financial “innovation”.  According to Tett (2010): 
…Bretton Woods system of credit and exchange controls, which had maintained relative 
stability in world markets, broke down, and the values of foreign currencies, which had 
been pegged to the dollar, became free-floating. That led to unpredictable swings in 
8 
 
exchange rates. Oil price shocks then sparked a pernicious blend of recession and 
inflation in the US… Shocked investors scurried to find ways to protect themselves from 
the devastating impact of the high interest rates … and from relentless swings in 
exchange rate. [An]… innovative way to protect against swings was to buy derivatives 
offering clients the right to purchase currencies at specific exchange rates in the future… 
allowing investors and bankers to gamble on the level of rates in the future.  
If the early-century, pre-Depression emergence of formalized consumer finance 
represented an act of systematization, the late-century scramble for financial profits 
represented an act of desperation – with the riskiest edge of financial capitalism transforming 
into what has been dubbed “casino capitalism” (Strange 1997). In the last two decades of the 
century, Finanzkapital – ever desperate for new avenues of accumulation – began to unleash a 
growing range of “financially engineered” instruments (Patterson 2010), many of which relied 
on hapless consumers accumulating greater debts. The sharp divergence between steady, high 
credit card interest rates and falling overall interest rates (Massey 2009) made consumers the 
golden cash cows for many financial institutions. Consumer credit had already proven to be a 
great source of profits in the 1920s and in post-World War II period. By century’s end, credit-
driven consumer demand became the desperate last refuge of Finanzkapital.  
As the sun set on the 20th century, consumers were truly impaled on the horns of a 
macro-micro dilemma. If they did not consume at high levels, the macro economy could plunge 
into recessionary crisis. Infused with the drug of easy credit, if they did consume at exhorted 
high levels, they faced the micro-level risk of defaulting and going bankrupt – all the while 
continuing to pay exorbitant interest charges and penalties to the bankers.  
Concluding Comments 
In the marketing discipline, we need to come to grip with the fact that – especially in 
times of economic crises – not just consumers but also marketing managers become mere 
pawns in the Great Game of Finance, a game that has turned both global and reckless. The 
tilting concentration of power in the global financial center affects all aspects of economy, 
society and culture – including marketing practices, brands, and consumers. The impacts of 
financial globalization – and I would add global financialization (Orhangazi 2008, Panitch and 
Konings 2009) – are understood at some levels: 
Financial globalization clearly enhances the leverage of investor interests… Owners of 
[globally] mobile capital…gain influence at the expense of less fortunate actors, 
including…national capital as well as labor (Cohen 1996, p. 286). 
We need to add consumers to the ranks of “less fortunate actors”.  By the end of the 20th 
century, with other avenues of profit exhausted, Finanzkapital turned to strategies focused on 
consumers and brands. Expanding consumer credit and aiding brand infatuation created the 
first major borrow-buy-pay link. Banks (and the financial system behind them) made money 
from credit card interest, and also from the rising stock prices of corporations whose brands 
dominated consumer consciousness. The second borrow-buy-pay link was created by 
fomenting a housing price bubble and incentivizing consumers to take out home equity loans 
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for everything – including frivolous consumption (Klein 1999). The capillaries sucking consumer 
dollars from Main Street to Wall Street became fire hoses. 
My story ends as the page turned shut on the 20th century. 
The major financial quake and its aftermath for consumers, of course, burst upon us at 
the beginning of the 21st century – accounts of which are proliferating and shocking (Cohan 
2009, Johnson and Kwak 2010, Morgenson and Rosner 2011, Sorkin 2010). The story indeed 
may end in a great tragedy (Monbiot 2011) if people – qua consumers and citizens – do not 
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